The senior British Army commander in Northern Ireland warned Irish diplomats his troops could not get involved in the 1996 Drumcree stand-off over fears of loss of life because “our job is to kill people – and we do it very well”.
he startling exchange was revealed in secret papers released as part of the State Papers.
The British Army General Officer Commanding in Northern Ireland, Lt General Rupert Smith, insisted to Department of Foreign Affairs officials in 1996 that his troops could only act in support of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) units deployed at Drumcree.
Drumcree became a flashpoint in Northern Ireland as loyalists flocked to support protests over the refusal to allow the Portadown Orange Lodge to march past Drumcree Church via the mainly nationalist Garvaghy Road.
There was widespread rioting across Northern Ireland as well as a spate of sectarian attacks when the peace process was at a critical stage.
On September 19, 1996, Seán Ó hUigínn, Second Secretary at the Anglo-Irish Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs, received a confidential briefing note from joint secretary David Donoghue about a dinner he had with Lt General Smith.
Issues raised varied from the Drumcree protests to the Parachute Regiment.
“We reviewed in detail the Drumcree crisis and how it might have been averted,” the memo read. “Smith was adamant that the Army could not have played other than a support role for the RUC – in the sense of logistical back-up, taking up RUC duties elsewhere so as to free more policemen for duties at Drumcree.
“He made clear that he had offered strong advice at the time to the effect that the deployment of soldiers in a more active role would have automatically led to fatalities.
“Our job is to kill people, he remarked in stark terms, and we do it very well.”
Lt Gen Smith was blunt with the Irish diplomats that soldiers should not be tasked with a policing role.
“Smith’s intellectual abilities, much in display, rarely translated into an enlightened vision of what the
Army could do to defuse long-standing suspicions about its role here and to promote better relations with the nationalist community,” the memo noted.
When Irish officials raised concerns about the Parachute Regiment being deployed in Armagh, Lt Gen Smith was noted as becoming defensive.
“I am one of the tribe,” he replied, having been commissioned into the Paras as a second lieutenant in 1964.
“(He was) bullish in his response. While Bloody Sunday had been completely unforgivable, the Paras’ record over the intervening years was, he claimed, statistically no worse than any other regiment in Northern Ireland.
“Further, it was not possible administratively to ensure that the Paras (who constitute 5pc to 10pc of all British Army infantry) did not serve in Northern Ireland.”
The memo continued: “And, in any event, other regiments disapproved strongly of special dispositions of either a positive or negative character and would combine to ensure there was no exclusion order on the Paras.”
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